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OF BABIES, BATHWATER, AND THROWING OUT PROOF 
STRUCTURES: IT IS NOT TIME TO JETTISON MCDONNELL 
DOUGLAS 
BY 
WILLIAM R. CORBETT* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Birth and Ascendancy of McDonnell Douglas 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green,' its first case involving the individual disparate treatment 
theory of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.2 In that case, the Court announced a three-part 
. Vice Chancellor and Rosemary Neal Hawkland Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana 
State University Law Center. I thank Susan S. Grover of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of 
the College of William and Mary and Deborah C. Malamud of the University of Michigan Law 
School for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I benefited from discussions with 
my colleagues Jay S. Bybee, Kenneth M. Murchison, and John Valery White. I also thank 
Melissa Morse Shaw, LSU Class of 1997, and Allyson Sloane Shroyer, LSU Class of 1998, for 
their research assistance. 
1. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). In a Title VII individual disparate treatment case, 
a plaintiff attempts to prove that her employer treated her less favorably than similarly situated 
employees because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). A plaintiff proceeding under the disparate 
treatment theory must prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive or animus. 
Id. 
The Court's first Title VII decision was Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
It involved the disparate impact theory or model of employment discrimination rather than the 
individual disparate treatment theory. Whereas disparate treatment is a theory based on inten-
tional discrimination, disparate impact is based on either negligence or strict liability. See David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 931-36 (1993) (rec-
ognizing that, although disparate impact is fundamentally a strict liability-based theory, it has 
evolved to include negligent discrimination). In a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff alleges that 
a facially neutral employment practice, such as a job skills test or degree requirement, has a sig-
nificant disproportionate impact or effect on members of a protected class, and the practice 
cannot be justified as a "business necessity." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The disparate im-
pact analysis, as articulated in Griggs and developed in subsequent cases, was modified by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k) (1994). Griggs also is so well known in employment discrimination circles that it 
probably can stand on its one-party name and conjure up an entire branch of employment dis-
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proof structure' or analysis for intentional discrimination cases in 
which the evidence presented is circumstantial. Under the proof 
structure, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of intentional dis-
crimination by proving the following: 1) plaintiff belongs to a pro-
tected class; 2) plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job at issue; 
3) despite plaintiff's qualifications, the employer rejected him; and 4) 
after the employer's rejection of plaintiff, the position remained open, 
and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications like 
those of plaintiff.! If a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, a rebutta-
ble presumption of intentional discrimination arises,' and the burden 
of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate (non-
discriminatory) reason for its employment action. If the employer 
satisfies its burden of production, the burden of production again 
shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's articulated reason is 
a pretext for discrimination Although the burden of production 
shifts at the second and third stages of this proof structure, the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion that the employer intentionally discrimi-
nated remains with the plaintiff at all times.' 
In the years following McDonnell Douglas, the Court has ex-
plained the reason it developed this proof structure: determining 
crimination law. It does not rival McDonnell Douglas for celebrity status, however, because 
there are so many more individual disparate treatment cases under Title VII and the other fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes than there are disparate impact cases. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has suggested that disparate impact may not apply under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 
(1993). 
3. In the first sentence of the opinion, the Court explained what it was creating--a proof 
structure: "The case before us raises significant questions as to the proper order and nature of 
proof in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 793. 
4. Id. at 802. The Court was quick to point out that the elements of a prima facie case will 
vary depending on the facts. Id. at 802 n.13. For example, the Court in McDonnell Douglas 
actually stated as the first element of the prima facie case that the plaintiff must establish "that 
he belongs to a racial minority." Id. at 802. The Court later explained in McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), a case involving white plaintiffs, that McDonnell Douglas 
did not restrict Title VII to racial minorities. Rather, "specification ... of the prima facie proof 
required . . . is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the elements of the prima facie case vary depending 
on the type of adverse employment action taken. McDonnell Douglas, as the statement of the 
prima facie case elements indicates, involved the adverse employment action of refusal to hire 
(actually, refusal to rehire). 
5. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981). 
6. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56 (discussing 
employer's burden of production). 
7. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 515-16 (1993). 
8. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. 
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whether an employer intentionally discriminated on a prohibited ba-
sis is "both sensitive and difficult"' and involves an inquiry into a per-
son's state of mind.'o The proof structure assists those who believe 
they are victims of such discrimination in proving this when the al-
leged discriminators do not bestow upon them "direct evidence" of 
intentional discrimination." In McDonnell Douglas, the Court pro-
claimed its belief that the development of the proof structure prop-
erly balanced the various societal and personal interests at stake and 
the uncompromising policy of Title VII to eliminate invidious dis-
crimination in * employment. * 12 
Since 1973, the McDonnell Douglas analysis has flourished in the 
courts, becoming the predominant method for analyzing intentional 
employment discrimination claims." Indeed, McDonnell Douglas has 
been so influential that it has spread beyond employment discrimina-
9. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). 
10. Id. 
11. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (0, Connor, J., concurring) 
( [T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact 
that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by."). 
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. The Court offered a succinct and eloquent state-
ment of the interests and policies to be balanced when Title VII steps into the modem employ-
ment setting, dominated by the common law principles of employment at will: 
There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of this equation. The 
broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient 
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment 
and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly 
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise. 
Id. 
13. McDonnell Douglas was a Title VII case, but the proof structure has been applied by 
courts under all of the federal employment discrimination laws. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consoli-
dated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 & n.2 (1996) (assuming arguendo, as courts rou-
tinely have done, that the analysis applies under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
and collecting cases); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (col-
lecting cases applying analysis to claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act), opinion 
reinstated in relevant part on reh'g en banc, No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 
1998). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency charged with enforcement 
of the federal employment discrimination laws, considers the proof structure applicable to 
claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. EEOC: En-
forcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405: 
7175, 7175 n.2 (issued April 12, 1994). The application of McDonnell Douglas in ADA cases, 
however, has not been universally applauded. See, e.g., Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the 
Application of McDonnell Douglas to Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 MiNN. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1995) (arguing that McDonnell 
Douglas analysis does not take into account the differences between discrimination based on 
disabilities and discrimination based on the classes protected under Title VII and does not im-
pose an appropriate allocation of burdens of proof under the ADA); Kevin W. Williams, Note, 
The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting 
Frameworks Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought Under 
Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 98, 160 
(1997) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas is appropriate only in ADA cases in which employer 
claims employment action is unrelated to plaintiff's disability). 
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tion cases to employment actions brought under other types of fed-
eral and state employment lawsl4 and to discrimination cases in con-
texts other than employment law." Because the proof structure is 
ubiquitous in employment law, the mere name McDonnell Douglas 
conjures up much of the law prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment. Consequently, any change in the law regarding the McDonnell 
Douglas proof structure necessarily has a far-reaching impact on em-
ployment discrimination law particularly, and employment law gener-
ally. 
The year 1998 is the silver anniversary of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis. In view of the prevalence of McDonnell Douglas in em-
discrimination law and its laudable purpose,1 one might ex-ployment 
pect that employment discrimination law scholars, practitioners, and 
observers would celebrate the occasion and heap praise on the vener-
able proof structure. Sadly, that has not been the case. Notwith-
standing the proliferation of the proof structure in the courts, it has 
been dealt some damaging blows by the Supreme Court that gave 
birth to it. Moreover, it has suffered attacks at the hands of commen-
tators. If I were to plan a gala to celebrate the anniversary, I would 
be hard pressed to round up scholars who would join me in the cele-
bration. Most of them who have written on the subject are ready to 
jettison McDonnell Douglas." I, for one, however, come not to jetti-
son McDonnell Douglas, but to praise it. 
B. The Assault on McDonnell Douglas 
In 1989, the first event that began impinging on McDonnell 
Douglas' domain occurred, and since that time other events have con-
tinued the assault. In that year, a badly fragmented Supreme Court 
announced a second proof structure for intentional discrimination 
14. See, e.g., Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying 
analysis to retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994)); 
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying analysis to retaliation claim 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994)); McGrath v. TCF Bank Say., 
FSB, 502 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. App.) (applying analysis to state whistleblower claim), modified on 
other grounds, 509 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1993). But see Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 
F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that, although McDonnell Douglas analysis may be ap-
propriate for retaliation claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, it is not appropriate 
for FMLA claims alleging violations of substantive rights). 
15. E.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir.) (applying the analysis 
to a claim under the Fair Housing Act), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 610 (1996). 
16. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
17. See sources cited infra note 25. 
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cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins." Saying that McDonnell 
Douglas was being asked to "perform work that it was never intended 
to perform,"'9 the Court developed a proof structure to be applied in 
"mixed-motives" cases.20 With the advent of a new proof structure for 
disparate treatment cases, there was a chink in the walls, but even af-
ter Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the vast majority of cases were 
evaluated under McDonnell Douglas. 
Then in 1993, the Court decided St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks,21 which diminished, somewhat, the McDonnell Douglas proof 
structure's role in intentional discrimination cases. Since 1993, some 
federal courts have interpreted Hicks in a way that further weakens 
McDonnell Douglas and deprives the proof structure of some of its 
18. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). I do not accord Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins the single-name 
honor that I reserve for McDonnell Douglas. Indeed, the Court did not respect Price Water-
house v. Hopkins enough to reach a majority opinion in the case itself, and Congress did not 
respect it enough to forego modifying the proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996). In contrast, McDonnell Douglas 
was a unanimous opinion of the Court, and Congress has not had the audacity to touch the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure-although perhaps it should repair it in the aftermath of St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
19. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion). The plurality was so disrespectful 
of McDonnell Douglas that it referred to the proof structure as "Burdine's framework." Bur-
dine was merely the case that clarified stage two of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
20. The Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis was subsequently modified and codified 
by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). In prac-
tice, most courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas proof structure to cases involving circum-
stantial evidence of discrimination and the mixed-motives proof structure to cases involving di-
rect evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th 
Cir. 1995). Professor Michael Zimmer has argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was in-
tended to eliminate the application of different analyses to intentional discrimination cases de-
pending on the type of evidence adduced. Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure 
of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 625 (1996) ("[A]ll indi-
vidual disparate treatment cases, whether the cases might now be characterized as 'mixed mo-
tive' or 'pretext' cases, should be analyzed under the two step process of new sections 703(m) 
and 706(g)(2)(B) of Title VII . . . ."). The Second Circuit addressed this argument in Fields v. 
New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116 (2d 
Cir. 1997). The court in Fields agreed with a piece of the argument, but not the whole. Plaintiff, 
who had lost his race discrimination claims in the trial court, argued that the trial court commit-
ted error in giving the jury a pretext instruction rather than a mixed-motives instruction. The 
court agreed with plaintiff that, regardless of whether a case is evaluated under McDonnell 
Douglas or the mixed-motives analysis, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does impose "motivating 
factor" rather than "but for" as the standard of causation. Id at 120-21. Thus, a plaintiff is not 
required to prove that the employer's articulated reason is pretextual. Id. at 120. The court dis-
agreed with plaintiff (and Zimmer), however, that the two-part mixed-motives analysis of the 
1991 Act applies to all individual disparate treatment cases. The court first stated that "the dis-
tinction between 'dual motivation' and 'substantial motivation' jury instructions survives the 
1991 Act." Id. at 124. It then held that the "affirmative defense" at step two of the mixed-
motives analysis only should be included in jury instructions in the same types of cases as before 
the 1991 Act. Id. 
21. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
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procedural significance.22 
The Court's assault on McDonnell Douglas, which has rendered 
it a less potent weapon in the campaign against employment discrimi-
nation, has sparked criticism of the proof structure and calls for its 
abandonment by academics and practitioners. The most influential of 
these has been an article by Professor Deborah Malamud.23  In that 
article, Professor Malamud first argues that the Supreme Court cor-
rectly decided St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.2 4 She further con-
tends that, because Hicks has rendered the McDonnell Douglas proof 
structure meaningless, McDonnell Douglas should be abandoned in 
favor of an open-ended standard for intentional discrimination in 
which the only question is whether the employer intentionally dis-
criminated in violation of the relevant federal discrimination statute. 
I emphatically disagree with Professor Malamud on both of her con-
tentions. 
In short, the last few years have not been very good ones for 
McDonnell Douglas. I intend to celebrate the silver anniversary by 
debunking Hicks and proclaiming that, although it has developed 
22. See infra notes 94-115 and accompanying text, discussing summary judgment and judg-
ment as a matter of law under the McDonnell Douglas analysis after Hicks. 
23. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 2229 (1995). Professor Malamud's fine article has been influential. For example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited it in support of its decision to adopt the middle 
ground, rather than "pretext plus" or "pretext only," approach to summary judgment and judg-
ment as a matter of law under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil 
Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, although rejecting Professor Malamud's recommendation on the pretext-
plus/pretext-only debate, recognized Professor Malamud's article as the scholarly standard 
bearer of that position. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d at 882-83. (D.C. Cir.) ("We 
acknowledge that our colleague's proposed contrary reading of Hicks, . is not entirely novel, 
inasmuch as it reflects the approach taken by two of our sister circuits and advocated in a 1995 
law review article . . "). Professor Malamud's position fared better, however, when the full 
court reheard Aka. No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1998) (en banc). The court, 
on rehearing, abandoned the panel majority's pretext-only approach and joined the Fifth Circuit 
in adopting a middle-ground approach. Aka, 1998 WL 698396, at *8-9. Professor Malamud's 
article also has generated criticism. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The 
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 324-34 (1997) (criticizing Malamud's ar-
gument that St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks was decided correctly). 
24. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2236-37. 
25. Id. at 2317-24. Professor Malamud is not alone in calling for abandoning McDonnell 
Douglas; indeed, calls for elimination or modification of the proof structure are in vogue. See, 
e.g., Judith Olans Brown, et. al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment 
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1487, 1527 n.182 (1997) (agreeing with Malamud that it would be best to abandon McDonnell 
Douglas); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate 
Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, 
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 
(1995); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the 
Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997). 
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some problems, McDonnell Douglas has been instrumental in the ef-
forts to eradicate employment discrimination. Moreover, it is still 
significant in 1998, notwithstanding Hicks. Rendering such a procla-
mation, however, requires me to take on Professor Malamud, whom I 
consider to have launched the strongest defense of Hicks and the 
most complete and potent attack on McDonnell Douglas.2 6 
II. THE FOLLY OF HICKS AND THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF 
McDONNELL DOUGLAS 
Professor Malamud's article contains an insightful evaluation of 
McDonnell Douglas and a careful tracing of the evolution of the 
analysis. She is clearly correct about the shortcomings of the prima 
facie case. She chronicles the Supreme Court's unsuccessful attempts 
to address the substantive problems created by the weakness of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Those failures resulted in the 
Court's minimizing the procedural consequences of the meager prima 
facie case. Professor Malamud's article then focuses on the eviden-
tiary weakness of the prima facie case in support of her conclusion 
that the Court correctly decided Hicks.27 In focusing on the weakness 
of the prima facie case, however, she undervalues the evidentiary 
strength of the "combined evidence" (prima facie case and proof of 
pretext). More importantly, she concedes, contrary to her sympa-
thies, that the policy regarding federal employment discrimination 
laws as embodied in the Supreme Court's decisions did not compel a 
different result in Hicks. She makes this concession because of what 
she perceives to be the "essentially conservative" foundation of the 
Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas line of cases.2 8 Although the 
McDonnell Douglas decisions of the Court do not, in result, declare 
the primacy of the federal employment discrimination laws, there is 
recognition in many of the Court's decisions, including McDonnell 
Douglas itself, that the goal of eradicating employment discrimination 
is important. Moreover, the Court is not the only oracle of federal 
policy; even if the McDonnell Douglas line of cases were as bereft of 
sympathy for the policies favoring the discrimination laws as Mala-
mud concludes, the whole of federal policy on employment discrimi-
nation, including congressional articulations, should have required a 
26. "This was the most unkindest cut of all; ... ".WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS 
CAESAR, act 3, sc.2. 
27. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2254-62. 
28. Id. at 2262-66. 
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different result in Hicks. 
Professor Malamud reaches her second conclusion largely be-
cause she thinks that Hicks has rendered the McDonnell Douglas 
proof structure meaningless, and she believes that McDonnell Doug-
las interferes with courts' and juries' ability to focus on the real issue 
in intentional discrimination cases. Even though Hicks has rendered 
the analysis less helpful to plaintiffs, the proof structure remains im-
portant in pretrial stages of litigation, perhaps in instructions to juries, 
and in employer-employee relations outside litigation. McDonnell 
Douglas requires an employer to give a nondiscriminatory reason for 
its actions and focuses attention on a plaintiff's challenge of the rea-
son and the implications of a successful challenge. It is important for 
employers to understand that the employment-at-will doctrine does 
not reign over the landscape of employment law unchecked. Em-
ployers may not take adverse employment actions for all "bad" rea-
sons.2 9 Some bad reasons have been prohibited by the federal em-
ployment discrimination laws. Because there is an ongoing battle 
between employment at will and the employment discrimination 
laws, 0 the McDonnell Douglas proof structure, even though weak-
ened by Hicks, retains vital symbolic value." It is the guardian of a 
29. The classic statement of the employment-at-will doctrine recognizes that employers 
may terminate employees or take other adverse actions for good reasons, bad reasons, or no 
reason at all. See, e.g. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884), overruled on 
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915) ("All may dismiss their employees 
at-will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, 
without thereby being guilty of legal wrong."); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992) ("An antidis-
crimination law is the antithesis of freedom of contract, a principle that allows all persons to do 
business with whomever they please for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all."). 
30. In part II.B.3, infra, I will describe briefly the battles in the Supreme Court and Con-
gress between the federal employment discrimination laws and the common law employment-
at-will doctrine. I discuss this struggle more fully in William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, 
The Rise of "Pretext Plus," and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimi-
nation Law to Employment at Will: Lessons From McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 
(1996). Professor Cynthia Estlund also has addressed the tension between employment dis-
crimination law and employment at will. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protec-
tions in an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1655, 1671-72 (1996). 
31. Professor Malamud recognizes the importance of symbols in discrimination law. She 
argues, for example, that replacing the discrimination statutes with legislation requiring just 
cause for termination would forsake "important symbolic and pedagogic ends" of the discrimi-
nation laws. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2316-17. Indeed, Professor Malamud's main hesitation 
with recommending that McDonnell Douglas be abandoned is the potential symbolic loss of 
declaring that there are no preferential rules for individual discrimination cases. Id. at 2324. 
She addresses this concern with a question: "[W]hat is the symbolic significance of acting as 
though there are preferential standards for disparate treatment cases when, in fact, after Hicks, 
there are none?" Id. at 2324. The premise for this question is dubious. As I will discuss in part 
II.B, infra, even after Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure retains greater symbolic 
value and practical value than Professor Malamud accords it. 
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fading but still discernible boundary between the federal employment 
discrimination laws and employment at will. 
A. Why Professor Malamud Is Wrong About the Court Being Right in 
Hicks 32 
Professor Malamud prefaces her discussion of why Hicks was 
correctly decided with a declaration, in the nature of an apology, that 
her sympathies were with the dissent and she wanted to side with 
those decrying the Hicks decision as a conservative Court's aban-
donment of the pro-plaintiff decisions and principles developed in 
discrimination decisions of the early 1970s." Notwithstanding her 
sympathies, Professor Malamud embarks upon a tracing of the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure from its origin through Hicks, 
which leads her "reluctantly" to conclude that the Court correctly 
decided Hicks.34 Although I agree in large part with Professor Mala-
mud's analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions, in which she focuses 
on the weakness of the prima facie case, I do not believe that it is a 
sufficient ground on which to conclude that the Court "correctly" de-
cided Hicks. Professor Malamud could have followed her sympa-
thies. Arguing that Hicks should have been decided as the dissent 
contended is both intellectually defensible and consistent with the 
policies that undergird Title VII and the other federal employment 
discrimination statutes. 
32. I am reluctant to say that the Court majority reached a wrong result in Hicks. See Est-
lund, supra note 30, at 1671 ("Whether [the Hicks] interpretation of Title VII is right or wrong 
(and it is not obviously wrong, . . ."). The Court did not wrongly interpret language in Title 
VII, and it did not wrongly apply holdings of prior Supreme Court decisions. It did, of course, 
rule contrary to dictum in Burdine, but the majority acknowledged that point. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
at 515-20. I thus must content myself with arguing that the Court did not decide Hicks well in 
view of the policies supporting federal employment discrimination law and that the Court did 
not decide the case correctly, in the sense that the dissent's resolution would have been incor-
rect. See THE READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 303 (10th ed. 1975) 
(" Correct suggests that there are only two possibilities (correct and incorrect) and that discrimi-
nation between them is easy . . . ."). Professor Selmi, in his criticism of Professor Malamud's 
defense of Hicks, labels Hicks a bad decision, not because it is inconsistent with precedent, but 
because it is about line drawing in employment discrimination cases and the Court chose to 
draw the line in favor of employers who may be subject to unfounded judgments rather than in 
favor of deserving employment discrimination victims who may lose cases. See Selmi, supra 
note 23, at 332-33. 
33. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2236. 
34. Id. at 2236-37. 
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1. Strength of the "Combined Evidence"" 
Professor Malamud recognizes that the majority in Hicks was not 
constrained, as it declared, by Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to hold that a plaintiff proving a prima facie case and pretext 
under McDonnell Douglas is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Professor Malamud instead grounds her agreement with the 
Hicks majority on her assessment of the evidentiary weakness of the 
prima facie case and the combined evidence of the prima facie case 
and pretext. I share Professor Malamud's concern about the weak-
ness of the prima facie case alone, although I support shifting the 
burden of production after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. 
Indeed, her careful chronicling of the Court's struggles with the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case demonstrates that the Court has 
recognized its weakness, but failed to buttress it, although presented 
with opportunities. I disagree, however, with Professor Malamud's 
and the Hicks majority's assessment of the weakness of a plaintiff's 
evidentiary showing once the plaintiff proves that the employer's ar-
ticulated reason for its action is pretextual. 
Professor Malamud concludes that Hicks was decided correctly, 
largely because she cannot accept the "basic assumption."3 7 The basic 
assumption is the label affixed by Professor Deborah Calloway to the 
proposition that "absent explanation, adverse treatment of statutorily 
protected groups is more likely than not the result of discrimina-
tion."3 Professor Calloway posits that the Court's decision in Hicks 
represents a challenge of this basic assumption.3 9 Although Professor 
Malamud knows that Professor Calloway's basic assumption and the 
Hicks decision address the effect of the combined evidence of prima 
facie case and pretext, she at times loses this focus, discussing instead 
35. Professor Malamud uses this term to refer to the evidence supporting the prima facie 
case and the evidence used to prove that the employer's articulated reason is pretextual. E.g., 
id. at 2243. 
36. Id. at 2262 n.110. The majority stated that the Court "ha[s] no authority to impose li-
ability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless an appropriate 
factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, that the employer has unlawfully dis-
criminated." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514 (emphasis in original). Professor Malamud points out that 
Rule 301 controls instead the question of what effect proving a prima facie case has, and that 
question was answered in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 
37. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2254-55. 
38. Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic As-
sumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 997-98 (1994). 
39. Id. at 998; see also Selmi, supra note 23, at 332 (criticizing the Hicks majority for being 
"unwilling to accept the necessary implication of its proof structure: that discrimination remains 
a vital explanation for workplace ... decisions"). 
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the inadequacy of just the prima facie case to require a judgment for a 
plaintiff.4 0 Professor Malamud's focus on the weakness of the prima 
facie case causes her to undervalue the evidentiary strength of the 
combined evidence. 
The Hicks dissent firmly grounded its position on the strength of 
the combined evidence: 
Such proof [the prima facie case] is merely strengthened by show-
ing, through use of further evidence, that the employer's articulated 
reasons are false, since "common experience" tells us that it is 
"more likely than not" that the employer who lies is simply trying 
to cover up the illegality alleged by the plaintiff.41 
Although I agree with Malamud that the dissent "overplay[ed] 
the 'morality' card,"4 2 by emphasizing the probativeness of an em-
ployer's "lies" on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the 
moralizing is not essential to support the dissent's thesis that the 
combined evidence is strong enough to support a rule requiring 
judgment for a plaintiff. Unlike Professor Malamud, I think the dis-
sent's (and Professor Calloway's) "basic assumption" reasonably de-
scribes the current situation in employment relations in the United 
States. Furthermore, to the extent the basic assumption may be 
overly broad in its description, it is important enough as a matter of 
policy that it should govern disparate treatment cases. 
Professor Malamud rejects the basic assumption for several rea-
sons. The first is that she finds the assumption underlying it43 to be 
that, absent discrimination, employment decisions are "fair and rea-
sonable" and can be proven to be so." I think she states the "more 
basic assumption" imprecisely. Were I to subscribe to her formula-
40. For example, in the summary paragraph of her section on the evidentiary value of the 
disproven justification, Professor Malamud states, "I conclude that the weight of the evidence 
does not support the conclusion that all unexplained adverse decisions should be treated as dis-
criminatory once a prima facie case has been proven." Malamud, supra note 23, at 2261 (empha-
sis added). Confusion would be understandable because one of the declarations of the Court on 
which Professor Calloway founds the basic assumption is a statement regarding the prima facie 
case: "[T]he prima facie case 'raises an inference of discrimination because we presume 
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of im-
permissible factors.'" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). However, Professor Malamud's conclusion evinces not confusion, but 
instead the true focus of her analysis. Having demonstrated the Supreme Court's grappling with 
the weakness of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in the first part of her article, she con-
tinues to focus on the weakness of the prima facie case in her analysis culminating in her rejec-
tion of Professor Calloway's basic assumption. 
41. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 536 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Waters, 438 U.S. at 577). 
42. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2243 n.49. 
43. Does that make this assumption the "more basic assumption"? 
44. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2255. 
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tion of the underlying basis for the basic assumption, I would concur 
with her conclusion. What McDonnell Douglas rests on is not the as-
sumption that absent a fair and reasonable explanation, discrimina-
tion is the most likely explanation for adverse employment actions 
taken against members of protected groups. Instead, the foundation 
is that discrimination is the most likely explanation when the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied: employers, who know about the federal 
employment discrimination laws (and many know about the McDon-
nell Douglas proof structure itself), take adverse employment actions 
against members of protected groups, and then, during litigation, ar-
ticulate explanations for their actions (and introduce evidence) which 
are disbelieved by the finder of fact. Stated in that way, I think the 
foundation for the "basic assumption" is a reasonable explanation of 
the state of employment relations in the United States. 
Professor Malamud argues that her experience as a practitioner 
and teacher leads her to believe that many adverse employment deci-
sions are "'wrongful' (. . . arbitrary or based on incorrect assessments 
of the facts)" or "'undefendable' (. . . employer cannot demonstrate 
that its actions were correct)."45 Although I do not dispute Professor 
Malamud's assessment of many employment actions, that does not 
undermine the evidentiary strength of the combined evidence. 
Rather, Professor Malamud's assertion misapprehends the meaning 
of "pretext" as used in the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The pretext 
that a plaintiff attempts to prove is that the reason given by the em-
ployer is not the reason for which it took the action. Such pretext is 
not necessarily proven by demonstrating that the employer was objec-
tively wrong in its assessment of an employee" or that it took the ac-
tion for a morally bad (other than discriminatory) or trivial reason. 41 
Stated differently, employers do not have to introduce evidence that 
their articulated reasons are either laudable or factually accurate; in-
stead, they must introduce evidence48 that those reasons, whether 
praiseworthy or contemptible (so long as not discriminatory within 
45. Id. 
46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259 ("The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged 
the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although 
this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination."). 
47. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (holding that terminating employee 
for reason that may constitute violation of ERISA does not violate ADEA). 
48. The burden of production that the employer bears at the second stage is light. Purkett 
v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995). At the third stage, however, although the plaintiff bears 
the burden of production, the employer usually must join battle and attempt to prove that the 
reason given at stage two did in fact motivate its decision. 
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the meaning of the relevant discrimination statute) and whether fac-
tually accurate or inaccurate, did motivate their actions.4 9 Professor 
Malamud recognizes this,0 but she fails adequately to account for it in 
her argument that the "basic assumption" does not reflect the reality 
of employers' decision making. 
I realize that employers who make incorrect assessments of em-
ployees and act based on those assessments are at risk of being disbe-
lieved by factfinders. That does not, however, change the fact that an 
employer can, under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, successfully 
defend an adverse employment action taken for "bad" or factually in-
correct reasons. Thus, I find the "basic assumption" to be a reason-
able construction of how employment decisions are made because it 
addresses the probable reason of an employer, which, aware of the 
federal employment discrimination laws, takes adverse action against 
a member of a protected group, and then, in the context of litigation, 
is unable to produce adequate evidence for the factfinder to conclude 
that it took the action for its chosen nondiscriminatory reason(s). 
A second reason that I accept the "basic assumption" and con-
clude that the dissent's position should have prevailed in Hicks is that 
I believe discrimination is still prevalent in our society and in em-
ployment relations." I agree with the assessment of some commenta-
tors that discrimination based on conscious bias or prejudice is de-
clining but that stereotype- or proxy-based discrimination is still 
prevalent.52 If this assessment is correct, then individuals are still fre-
quently having adverse employment actions taken against them be-
49. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 326 & n.217 (arguing that Professor Malamud misunder-
stands the second stage of the proof structure as requiring a reasonable rather than an articula-
ble reason). 
50. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2303-04 (discussing difference between arbitrary wrongful 
dismissals and discriminatory dismissals, and noting that "the actual truth or falsehood ... re-
lates to the question of liability only indirectly"). 
51. I do not read Professor Malamud as disagreeing with this belief. She does challenge 
the "basic assumption," however, because "discrimination is not a unitary phenomenon in 
American society .... [Therefore,] [tihe assumption that discrimination is the cause of all unjus-
tified actions against members of protected groups is unlikely to be equally justified in all of 
these varied circumstances." Id. at 2257-58 (footnote omitted). Although the assumption of 
discrimination is not equally justified in all circumstances, I believe that discrimination based on 
group membership is still pervasive enough to justify application of the assumption under the 
circumstances described in the McDonnell Douglas proof structure. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 
350 (arguing that discrimination in the world today is "pervasive and complex"). 
52. See generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers 
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1995). For a discussion distinguishing be-
tween discrimination based on bias and that based on proxy traits and stereotypes and consid-
ering the relative morality of each, see Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination 
Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
374 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 2:361 
cause of their membership in specific groups; it is of no consolation 
that the decisionmakers are not consciously prejudiced or biased 
against the group. Moreover, such stereotype-based discrimination is 
more difficult to prove because much of it is unconscious. 
Professor Malamud also takes issue with Professor Calloway's 
argument that the "basic assumption" is all the more important be-
cause society at large ("judges, juries, and members of this culture")54 
does not believe that it is true. Malamud points out that imposing law 
which is contrary to societal beliefs will raise serious questions in 
American society about whether justice is being achieved by the dis-
crimination laws." Two responses to this point are in order. The first 
is that both Professors Calloway and Malamud overstate, at least 
somewhat, the point that society does not believe that intentional dis-
crimination is still common in the workplace. Professor Malamud of-
fers as a highly visible example of society's questioning of the laws the 
current attacks on affirmative action.56 Both Professors Calloway and 
Malamud focus on affirmative action and its companion, the disparate 
impact theory of recovery. 7 That focus is improper for two reasons. 
First, I suspect that many people who believe that discrimination is 
not prevalent enough to justify affirmative action are willing to admit 
that many individual employment decisions are made for discrimina-
tory reasons." Second, it is disparate treatment, addressing inten-
tional discrimination, that is at the core of Title VII and the other dis-
crimination statutes." Even Professor Richard Epstein, who favors 
repeal of the discrimination statutes, concedes that disparate treat-
53. Armour, supra note 52, at 746-49 (discussing aversive racism); see also Charles R. Law-
rence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 317, 321-23 (1987) (discussing the difficulty in proving racial discrimination due to un-
conscious racism); Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 915-17 (arguing that prevalence of uncon-
scious racism necessitates adopting a negligence theory for employment discrimination to aug-
ment current theories based on intent and strict liability). 
54. Calloway, supra note 38, at 1008. 
55. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2260-61. 
56. Id. at 2260 n.105. 
57. Many employers undertake voluntary affirmative action to avoid potential liability un-
der the disparate impact theory. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discon-
tents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 136-39 (1995) (describing relationship between affirmative action and 
disparate impact). 
58. Professor Rutherglen argues that disparate impact and affirmative action have 
stretched the commonly understood meaning of discrimination to the point that the average 
citizen is concerned with whether the federal discrimination laws are achieving just results. Id. 
at 128-29. 
59. See, e.g. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
("Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it 
enacted Title VII. . . "); Calloway, supra note 38, at 997 (referring to disparate treatment as 
"the most basic form of discrimination"). 
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ment is consistent with the meaning of Title VII and that limiting race 
discrimination cases to disparate treatment would be a "practical 
compromise" to his proposal.6o If the employment discrimination 
laws are to remain a viable means of addressing employment dis-
crimination, the necessity of prohibiting intentional discrimination 
must be proclaimed without any apologies.61 
There is a second response to Professor Malamud's concern with 
the Court's imposing law inconsistent with societal beliefs: that is 
what the Court is supposed to do when society holds beliefs that 
would defeat justice. Professor Selmi explains the Supreme Court's 
diluting of employment discrimination doctrine, in Hicks and other 
cases, as tracking the desires of society to "wish away racial injus-
tice."6 Thus, although a majority in society may wish that discrimina-
tion no longer occurs based on the protected classes of Title VII, it is 
appropriate for the Court vigilantly to protect the statutorily created 
rights." 
As Professor Malamud concedes, the Court could have held in 
Hicks that the combined evidence under the McDonnell Douglas 
60. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 181. 
61. One indicator of the centrality of disparate treatment to the discrimination laws is the 
argument in defense of the disparate impact theory that it is a means of uncovering camouflaged 
intentional discrimination. 
62. In a strange and ironic sense, Professor Malamud and I are debating the countermajori-
tarian role of the Supreme Court. It is strange and ironic because generally one discusses that 
role when the Court is striking down laws enacted by the majority that violate constitutional 
rights of a minority. Here, Professor Malamud and I are discussing the role of the Court when a 
majority of society does not favor a judicial interpretation of legislatively enacted law. Is the 
proper role of the Court then to repudiate its own judicial gloss because of the beliefs of a ma-
jority? I do not think that either Professor Malamud or I would offer an absolute answer to that 
question, but I have less concern with the Court's adhering to its interpretations of law even 
when many in society believe they are wrong if such interpretations are necessary to protect the 
rights of a minority as declared by the Congress. For recent scholarship on the classic "coun-
termajoritarian difficulty," about which much has been written, see Barry Friedman, The His-
tory of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 333 (1998). 
63. Selmi, supra note 23, at 350. 
64. Professor Malamud may have identified exactly what the Court is doing in its Title VII 
decisions of the past decade or so: according the greatest protection to the rights that enjoy the 
most support in society and eroding the protection accorded to less popular rights. It is inter-
esting to note that, while Hicks and other Title VII cases addressing racial discrimination have 
diluted the protections accorded by Court doctrine, the Court's decisions on sexual harassment 
law have increased significantly the protections accorded by Court doctrine. In the 1997 term, 
for instance, the Court decided three sexual harassment cases in which the result favored plain-
tiffs. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that same-sex 
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 
2275 (1998) (holding that employers can be vicariously liable for harassment by supervisors and 
that no affirmative defense is available when harassment culminates in a "tangible employment 
action"); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (holding that uniform analysis, 
articulated in Faragher, applies to quid pro quo and hostile environment claims). 
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analysis required judgment for a plaintiff. The Court should have 
done so because the "basic assumption" underlying the McDonnell 
Douglas proof structure is, regrettably, still sound. Moreover, policy 
concerns favoring the employment discrimination laws should have 
been a significant factor in the Court's decision. 
2. Strong Public Policy On Which Federal Employment 
Discrimination Laws Are Based 
Professor Malamud recognizes that it is appropriate for policy to 
play a role in courts' decisions regarding sufficiency of the evidence.65 
I agree with this proposition, but I disagree with Professor Malamud 
on three matters: what policy the Court should have found in its own 
decisions; where it should have looked for policy; and what the policy 
considerations should have led the Court to do. 
Professor Malamud restricts her policy inquiry to the Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting McDonnell Douglas. Since the proof 
structure is the Court's creation, this may seem to be the appropriate 
inquiry. I do not agree that the inquiry should be so limited, however, 
for reasons I discuss below. The Court's decisions are nonetheless an 
appropriate starting point. Professor Malamud traces the Court's de-
cisions from McDonnell Douglas through Hicks and finds in them "an 
essentially conservative foundation"" that does not square with the 
"nostalgic" view that McDonnell Douglas was animated by a policy of 
helping discrimination plaintiffs prove their cases. She attributes this 
conservative bent in the decisions to a desire to insulate the disparate 
treatment cases from the pro-plaintiff innovations in disparate impact 
cases. 
67 
Although I agree with Professor Malamud that most of McDon-
nell Douglas' progeny exhibit, at least in result, a pro-defendant ori-
entation, I disagree with her on two points. First, I think that 
65. Regarding the role of policy, Professor Malamud states: 
Courts routinely take into account the policy concerns animating a body of substantive 
law when deciding sufficiency-of-the-evidence questions, . . . . Thus, if the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine proof structure indeed expresses the Court's policy judgment to look 
the other way when faced with the insufficiency of the "combined evidence," there 
would be good reason to adopt the "judgment for plaintiff required" position. 
Malamud, supra note 23, at 2262-63. 
66. Id. at 2266. 
67. Id. at 2263-66. 
68. I identify a different objective in those cases than does Professor Malamud. I have de-
picted those decisions as being driven by the Court's objective of protecting employers' preroga-
tives under the employment-at-will doctrine against any substantial incursion by the federal em-
ployment discrimination laws. See generally Corbett, supra note 30. Professor Malamud also 
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McDonnell Douglas itself is not subject to being classified with its 
progeny as pro-defendant. Although Malamud's characterization of 
the Court's decision as "overturn[ing] a pro-plaintiff decision by a 
court of appeals," 9 is accurate as far as it goes, the decision should 
not be characterized as a defeat for the plaintiff. Although the Court 
rejected the Eighth Circuit's pro-plaintiff conclusion that subjective 
criteria carry little weight in rebutting a prima facie case,0 the Court 
did approve a proof structure which clearly was intended to assist 
plaintiffs who have only" circumstantial evidence, as distinguished 
from direct evidence, in proving intentional discrimination. Indeed, 
the Court consistently has characterized the McDonnell Douglas 
proof structure as an aid to plaintiffs.72 Furthermore, the Court has in 
many of the disparate treatment cases limiting McDonnell Douglas, 
as Professor Malamud recognizes, extolled the discrimination laws 
and proclaimed their laudable goal of eradicating discrimination.73 
One may characterize such statements as "mere lip service," but the 
Court has actually rendered decisions that are, at least to some ex-
tent, consistent with the recognized policies. For example, in 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,74 after offering a suc-
cinct statement of the objectives of the employment discrimination 
laws, the Court rejected the Summers7 5 rule for the after-acquired evi-
dence defense, stating that "[i]t would not accord with this scheme" if 
after-acquired evidence precluded all relief in an employment dis-
crimination action." In short, Professor Malamud perceptively cri-
seems to recognize this objective of the Court: "[T]he earlier cases in the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine line contain readily quotable passages explaining the need to eradicate discrimination. 
But the same cases contain passages, less quotable but more closely tied to the Court's actual 
holding, that articulate a need to protect management prerogative against undue incursions." 
Malamud, supra note 23, at 2312-13. 
69. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2264. 
70. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04. 
71. I use this term guardedly because I am aware that some circumstantial evidence makes 
a better case than direct evidence and that the distinction between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence is often illusory. See e.g., Smith, supra note 25, at 382-88. 
72. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for 
the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by."); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("The shifting burdens of proof set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the 
unavailability of direct evidence."') (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 
1979)). 
73. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2312-13. 
74. 513 U.S. 352 (1995). Admittedly, McKennon was a post-Hicks decision. 
75. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
76. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358. 1 have argued elsewhere that the Court did not accord the 
policies of the discrimination laws the deference they are due in McKennon because the Court 
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tiques the view of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, pointing out 
that those cases are perhaps not as pro-plaintiff as the prevailing view 
describes them. She goes too far the other way, however, in essen-
tially characterizing the McDonnell Douglas cases as pro-defendant.7 
Second, I think Professor Malamud recommends an inquiry into 
policy that is unduly restricted. Focusing on the Court's disparate 
treatment cases fails to take into account that the Court has ravaged 
781 
disparate impact, too," and more thoroughly.79 Moreover, focusing 
on the Court's disparate treatment cases alone ignores the battle be-
tween the Court and Congress over the federal employment discrimi-
nation laws, with Congress having championed the more pro-plaintiff 
interpretations of the discrimination laws. 0 
I recognize at least two arguments against the Court's looking to 
Congress to identify policy that should have guided it to a different 
decision in Hicks. First, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure is 
the Court's creation, not Congress'. My response is twofold: the fed-
eral employment discrimination laws were created by Congress;' and 
Congress has amended the employment discrimination laws and en-
acted new laws in light of its belief in the continued viability of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis. Second, one could argue that the Court 
also held that, under certain circumstances, after-acquired evidence can be used to limit reme-
dies. Corbett, supra note 30. I am not recanting here, but I am recognizing that there is a par-
tial victory for the discrimination policies in McKennon. 
77. See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1568, 
1599 (1996) ("The McDonnell Douglas caseline evinces a special solicitude for plaintiffs that 
stems from the repugnance of discrimination."). 
78. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
79. Professor Malamud argues that in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny the Court was 
insulating disparate treatment against the pro-plaintiff innovations in disparate impact cases. 
Malamud, supra note 23, at 2237 & 2263-66. 
80. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was Congress's response to several pro-defendant deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. The Act overturned, in whole or in part, the following decisions: 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (diluting the "business necessity" de-
fense and placing the burden of disproving it on plaintiffs); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in employment discrimination actions 
by holding that § 1981 does not apply to conduct occurring after formation of a contract); 
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding statute of limitations applicable to 
discrimination actions based on a facially neutral seniority plan begins to run on date of adop-
tion of plan rather than date plan harms plaintiff); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding 
that white plaintiffs harmed by affirmative action plan in consent decree in separate action were 
not precluded from challenging the plan); Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 
U.S. 754 (1989) (denying plaintiff class an award of attorney's fees against union that intervened 
in class action to challenge settlement agreement). 
81. Cf. William P. Murphy, Meandering Musings about Discrimination Law, 10 LAB. LAW. 
649, 654 (1994) ( "If the statutes are intended to protect employees, is it proper judicial perfor-
mance to render, over and over, single-minded interpretations that favor employers and that 
predictably produce congressional reversal?"). 
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in Hicks must not have flouted Congress' view of federal employment 
discrimination policy; despite the proposal of legislation, Congress did 
not act to overturn Hicks legislatively.82 Congressional expressions, 
or the lack thereof, after Hicks obviously cannot indicate, however, 
what congressional expressions the Court should have considered in 
deciding Hicks. Given that Congress had recently, in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991,3 overruled numerous pro-defendant decisions of the 
Court, one might have thought that the Court would discern and fol-
low a congressional policy for interpreting the employment discrimi-
nation laws favorably for plaintiffs.' 
I attempt to determine the policy regarding employment dis-
crimination from a broader perspective than did Professor Malamud. 
That perspective leads me to believe that the Court in Hicks should 
have determined that a significant public policy required it to hold 
that plaintiffs who establish prima facie cases and prove pretext are 
entitled to judgments. 
In sum, the Supreme Court should have decided Hicks as four 
justices contended. Disagreeing with Professor Malamud, I think the 
Court should have accepted the "basic assumption" underlying the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure. I also think, contrary to Profes-
sor Malamud's argument, that the Court should have been driven to 
that result by a strong public policy of eradicating employment dis-
crimination. 
Regardless of what the Court should have decided in Hicks, it 
decided it in a way that reduces the significance of McDonnell Doug-
las. Thus, Professor Malamud's second conclusion demands atten-
tion. Is a post-Hicks McDonnell Douglas analysis worth maintaining? 
Professor Malamud answers that it is not, and she further argues that 
plaintiffs would benefit from an open-ended, unrestricted inquiry re-
garding discrimination. I disagree. 
82. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 23, at 2235 n.28 (discussing the failure of proposed leg-
islation). 
83. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
84. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: 
The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 1010 (1993) ("One might 
have thought that the conservative majority on this Court might have been chastened by Con-
gress' actions in specifically rejecting several Supreme Court opinions . . . ."). 
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B. Why Professor Malamud Is Wrong About Abandoning McDonnell 
Douglas 
Professor Malamud bases her argument for jettisoning McDon-
nell Douglas on her conclusion that the proof structure does not aid 
the trial court in its understanding of the pretrial factual record. She 
carefully goes through cases applying the proof structure at the sum-
mary judgment stage and concludes as follows: the prima facie case is 
troublesome;" the Supreme Court has rendered the employer's bur-
den of production at the rebuttal stage almost nonexistent (although 
it is not consistently so applied by the district courts);" and Hicks has 
left the federal courts uncertain what kind and quantity of evidence a 
plaintiff must produce to avoid summary judgment." I do not dis-
agree with Professor Malamud on any of those points, but I do not 
think they justify abandoning the proof structure. 
Professor Malamud's point that Hicks left open the issue of what 
effect proving pretext has on motions challenging sufficiency of the 
evidence, motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter 
of law, is one of the best arguments for retaining the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis. The proof structure still plays a significant practical 
role in the litigation of disparate treatment cases. Depending on how 
courts resolve that issue, the indirect route for producing sufficient 
evidence of intentional discrimination, and thus getting the issue of 
intentional discrimination before the jury, can be preserved. For 
those circuits that adopt the pretext-only approach, the McDonnell 
Douglas proof structure has an important role in courts' assessment 
of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence." 
A related point made by Malamud is that dispatching with 
McDonnell Douglas would remove the cumbersome and restrictive 
steps to determining whether an employer discriminated and leave 
courts free to develop innovative concepts of intentional discrimina-
tion." A review of decisions in the Fifth Circuit since its adoption of a 
"no rules" approach to the sufficiency of the evidence suggests that, 
85. For example, courts have difficulty determining what it means to be "qualified" in the 
context of different adverse employment decisions. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2282-90. Courts 
also struggle with what evidence is required to "create an inference of discrimination." Id. at 
2290-98. Finally, courts struggle with what effect a plaintiffs failure to make out a prima facie 
case has. Id. at 2298-2301. 
86. Id. at 2301-04. 
87. Id. at 2304-11. 
88. See infra notes 94-115 and accompanying text. 
89. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2319. 
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rather than encouraging innovative conceptualization of discrimina-
tion by courts, the rejection of special rules imposed by McDonnell 
Douglas has resulted in courts not seeing discrimination, even when 
juries did. 
Professor Malamud also rejects the notion that McDonnell 
Douglas can be helpful to jurors in determining the ultimate question 
in employment discrimination cases: whether intentional discrimina-
tion occurred."o Courts are divided on the issue of whether the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis should be included in jury instructions.9
Those that include it seem to subscribe to the belief, inherent in the 
creation of the proof structure, that organizing the evidence into dis-
crete and specific questions that explain its relevance leads to a better 
understanding of what intentional discrimination is than does the 
general question. 
Finally, Professor Malamud concedes that discarding the "pref-
erential rules" that McDonnell Douglas imposes on employment dis-
crimination cases would have the symbolic effect of removing the 
"societal thumb on the scale."" The symbolic value of stripping the 
special rules from employment discrimination cases gives Professor 
Malamud pause, but in the end, she concludes it is not enough to 
overcome her concerns with the practical meaningless of the McDon-
nell Douglas proof structure.93 I think that Professor Malamud un-
dervalues the symbolic significance of McDonnell Douglas. It is the 
symbolic flame, reminding employers, employees, attorneys, judges, 
juries, and lawmakers that the employment discrimination laws re-
strict the omnipresent and almost omnipotent doctrine of employ-
ment at will. 
1. McDonnell Douglas' Role in Determining Whether Plaintiffs 
Satisfy Their Burden of Production: The Effect of Hicks 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks is an overrated decision in 
terms of its devastating impact on plaintiffs in disparate treatment 
cases and its evisceration of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.94 It was 
90. Id. at 2323 ("Such legally complex instructions are hinderances (sic) to juror decision-
making: psychological studies show that juries understand complex facts better than complex 
law."). 
91. Not even the courts endorsing inclusion of a McDonnell Douglas instruction would give 
the full statement including language regarding the shifting burdens of production. See discus-
sion infra part II.B.2.a. 
92. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2324. 
93. Id. 
94. See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination, supra note 77, at 1576, 
' 
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heralded as a resolution of the "pretext-plus/pretext-only" split in the 
courts of appeals. The issue is whether proving pretext at stage three 
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis constitutes proof of discrimina-
tion. This is the so-called "indirect route" of proving discrimination 
articulated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.95 
The courts following the pretext-plus approach rejected an indirect 
route of proving discrimination, requiring that plaintiffs produce evi-
dence of pretext plus additional evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion. At the other pole, courts adhering to the pretext-only approach 
held that evidence of pretext alone was enough to prove intentional 
discrimination. Professor Lanctot described these distinct approaches 
to proving intentional discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework in a landmark article published in 1991.96 The context in 
which courts were grappling with this issue was almost always defen-
dants challenging the sufficiency97 of plaintiffs' evidence by motions 
for summary judgment or directed verdict or jnov.98 Stated differ-
ently, the question before the courts was whether plaintiffs who had 
proved pretext could survive challenges to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, not whether plaintiffs who had proved pretext had necessarily 
proven intentional discrimination and thus won the case. The distinc-
tion is between a plaintiff satisfying her burden of production and a 
plaintiff satisfying her burden of persuasion. 9 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks was a case in which a plaintiff 
argued that he was entitled to a judgment in a case because the trial 
court found that he had proved the employer's articulated reason was 
pretextual." Thus, Hicks was a case about the meaning of pretext in 
1593. 
95. 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) ("She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."). 
96. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the 
"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991). 
97. I use the word in its legal procedural sense. Both motions for summary judgment and 
motions for judgment as a matter of law challenge whether the nonmoving party has satisfied 
the burden of production, i.e., producing sufficient evidence for a case to be submitted to the 
finder of fact. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(en banc); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.15 (4th ed. 1992). 
98. With the 1991 amendment of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 50, motions for 
directed verdict and jnov are now collectively known as motions for judgment as a matter of 
law. 
99. For a good discussion of this issue, see T. Christopher Pledger, Note, Rhodes v. 
Guiberson Oil Tools: The Fifth Circuit's Approach to Pretext Evidence in Employment Dis-
crimination, 57 LA. L. REV. 1393, 1397-1403 (1997); see also Developments in the Law: Em-
ployment Discrimination, supra note 77, at 1597-1602. 
100. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508-09. 
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the context of burden of persuasion, not burden of production. The 
holding of Hicks that a plaintiff does not necessarily win a case by 
proving pretext alone does not mean that courts are precluded from 
holding that plaintiffs can survive challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence by proving pretext alone (the pretext-only approach). 
While Hicks removes the pretext-only sword from plaintiffs' hands, it 
does not remove the more important pretext-only shield. 
In view of the foregoing explanation of Hicks and the pretext-
plus/pretext-only debate, one may ask why Hicks should provide a 
reason to jettison the McDonnell Douglas framework. The role of 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis was always more important at pre-
trial stages than it was to the ultimate resolution by the finder of fact. 
Indeed, with the availability of jury trials in Title VII cases after the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, some courts do not give jury 
instructions based on McDonnell Douglas.'o' Professor Malamud's 
answer is not only that Hicks left the courts uncertain what pretext 
approach to adopt,02 but more importantly, that she thinks neither 
the pretext-plus nor the pretext-only approach should be adopted to 
determine sufficiency of the evidence questions.' She believes that 
McDonnell Douglas does not do a good job of shaping the pretrial 
decisionmaking, 04 and any rules based on that analysis are likely to 
"misfire."'0 s For policy reasons discussed above,o' I disagree with 
Professor Malamud, and I favor the pretext-only approach. Moreo-
ver, I think the experience in the Fifth Circuit, which essentially 
abandoned McDonnell Douglas pretext-based rules and adopted Pro-
fessor Malamud's no-rules approach, thus far has demonstrated that 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases do not fare better on 
101. See, e.g., Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995); 2 
MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 105.04 (2d ed. 1991). However, the issue 
has generated a split in the circuits. See Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 279-81 
(3d Cir. 1998) (describing the split, with the Seventh Circuit favoring not giving a pretext in-
struction to the jury, and the Second and Third Circuits holding that "jurors must be instructed 
that they are entitled to infer, but need not, that the plaintiff's ultimate burden of demonstrating 
intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence can be met if they find that the 
facts needed to make up the prima facie case have been established and they disbelieve the em-
ployer's explanation for its decision"). See discussion infra part II.B.2. (discussing whether 
McDonnell Douglas analysis should be included in jury instructions). 
102. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2305. 
103. Id. at 2311 (" [D]isparate treatment cases differ from each other in the strength of their 
evidence, and . . . 'rules' are likely to misfire when they are based upon the assumption that 
cases are equally strong once all the relevant McDonnell Douglas-Burdine hurdles have been 
jumped."). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. See supra part II.A.2. 
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motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law 
without rules based on the proof structure. 
There is a circuit split on the pretext-plus/pretext-only issue."o 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission favors the pretext-
only approach.'o Because courts are free to adopt, and some are 
adopting, the pretext-only approach on the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence issue, the McDonnell Douglas analysis is still serving its 
original purpose of assisting plaintiffs who have only circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks has not 
changed that, and thus that case provides no reason to abandon the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure. 
The case for preserving McDonnell Douglas because of its role in 
determining sufficiency of the evidence is even stronger in light of the 
results in the Fifth Circuit, which adopted Professor Malamud's no-
rules approach. In Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools,0 9 the Fifth Circuit 
cited Professor Malamud's article in support of its decision to adopt a 
no-rules approach to the effect on the sufficiency-of-the-evidence is-
sue of proving pretext."o Even the Fifth Circuit, however, was un-
willing to adopt Malamud's approach "hook-line-and-sinker": the 
court was unwilling to abandon the McDonnell Douglas proof struc-
ture."' The court stated its no-rules version of McDonnell Douglas as 
follows: 
We believe that the question [effect of pretext] does not yield a 
categorical answer. Rather, we are convinced that ordinarily such 
verdicts [supported by pretext evidence] would be supported by 
sufficient evidence, but not always. The answer lies in our tradi-
tional sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis. [citing Malamud].112 
Despite the assurance that "ordinarily such verdicts would be 
supported by sufficient evidence," the progeny of Rhodes suggest that 
the no-rules approach is resulting in employment discrimination 
107. See R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys, Bursting Bubbles and Burdens of Proof 
The Deepening Disagreement on the Summary Judgment Standard in Disparate Treatment Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 207, 217-22 (1998) (putting the First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth in the pretext-plus camp, and the Third, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh 
in the pretext-only camp). The Fourth Circuit recently joined the pretext-plus camp. Vaughan 
v. MetraHealth Cos., 145 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit approach is really a 
no-rules approach. The D. C. Circuit also recently adopted that approach in a recent en banc 
opinion. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., No. 96-7089, 1998 WL 698396 (D.C. Cir. Oct., 9, 1998). 
108. EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 8 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Man. (BNA) 405: 7175, 7176-77, 7177 n.3 (issued April 12, 1994). 
109. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
110. Id. at 993. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. (emphasis added). 
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plaintiffs losing cases (on appeal) on challenges to the sufficiency of 
the evidence on both motions for summary judgment and motions for 
judgment as a matter of law. Of course, plaintiffs should lose some 
cases without the jury deciding them, but the results in the two-and-a-
half years since Rhodes was decided are eye-opening. Consider, for 
example, that the Fifth Circuit, under Rhodes, frequently is reversing 
judgments on jury verdicts in which the jury determined that there 
was discrimination.1 13 I am not suggesting that any one of these deci-
sions is wrong, but I am suggesting that the use of Rhodes to overturn 
so many jury findings of discrimination is alarming. It may be that the 
Fifth Circuit would have reached the same results even if it had 
adopted the pretext-only approach, but that is highly unlikely.114 In-
deed, the Fifth Circuit seems to be revelling in its Rhodes unusual 
case escape valve-the language "but not always." For example, in 
one of its decisions overturning an employment discrimination plain-
tiff's jury verdict, the court stated: 
[A]lthough evidence of pretext, in conjunction with a prima facie 
case, usually creates a jury question on the ultimate issue of dis-
crimination, it does not always do so. We engage in "traditional 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis" to determine whether reason-
able jurors could find discriminatory treatment. In other words, it 
is possible for a plaintiff's evidence to permit a tenuous inference of 
pretext and, by extension, discrimination, and yet for the evidence 
to be insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of discrimi-
nation." 
I do not think that the Fifth Circuit's no-rules approach, in which 
113. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing trial court's 
denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law after jury verdict for plaintiff in age discrimina-
tion case); Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing denial of 
motion for judgment as a matter of law after jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in age discrimina-
tion case); Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing denial of motion for 
judgment as a matter of law after jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in state law sex discrimination 
case); Travis v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 122 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing 
trial court's denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law after jury verdict for plaintiff in sex 
discrimination case), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1166 (1998); Swanson v. General Servs. Admin., 110 
F.3d 1180 (5th Cir.) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law af-
ter jury verdict for plaintiff in race discrimination case), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 366 (1997); On-
tiveros v. Asarco, Inc., 83 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for 
judgment as a matter of law after jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in national origin discrimina-
tion case). 
114. The pretext-only approach does not insulate a judgment on jury verdict against reversal 
by an appellate court. Judge Garza, concurring in Rhodes, stated that this would be the effect of 
adopting the pretext-only approach, which he favored. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 999 (Garza, J., con-
curring specially). This is wrong because an appellate court can determine that there was insuf-
ficient evidence of pretext. See Pledger, supra note 99, at 1407-09 (discussing Judge Garza's 
concurrence). 
115. Travis, 122 F.3d at 263. 
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plaintiffs frequently lose on appeal notwithstanding jury verdicts in 
their favor, is what Professor Malamud envisioned when she recom-
mended rejecting pretext-plus and pretext-only and abandoning 
McDonnell Douglas. Nonetheless, it has happened, and I think it of-
fers a good reason to keep McDonnell Douglas and to attach proce-
dural significance to the third stage evidence of pretext by adopting 
the pretext-only approach. 
2. A Pared-Down McDonnell Douglas Jury Instruction to Help 
Jurors Decide the Ultimate Issue of Intentional Discrimination 
Professor Malamud argues that not only has McDonnell Douglas 
been unhelpful and confusing to courts in deciding sufficiency of the 
evidence, but it is even less helpful and more confusing to juries when 
included in jury instructions.'16 It is important to remember that, be-
fore passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, jury trials were not avail-
able in Title VII cases. As Professor Malamud points out, some 
courts do not include the McDonnell Douglas analysis, or a pretext 
instruction, in jury instructions. A major reason usually given is that 
articulated by the Supreme Court in United States Postal Service 
Board of Governors v. Aikens:" once an employment discrimination 
case is fully tried, the court should not return to the question of 
whether the plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima 
facie case, but instead it should determine the ultimate question of 
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated."' 
Whether McDonnell Douglas should be included in jury instruc-
tions may be a large enough topic for an entire article, but it bears 
noting here that its inappropriateness is not as clear as Professor Ma-
lamud suggests. First, such an instruction is appropriate under cur-
rent post-Hicks employment discrimination law. Second, such an in-
struction is helpful to jurors in determining whether intentional 
discrimination occurred. 
(a) Appropriate Under Current Law 
One way to consider this issue is whether, under the post-Hicks 
state of the law, it is appropriate to give a McDonnell Douglas jury 
instruction. The Aikens statement simply instructed courts not to go 
116. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2323. 
117. 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
118. Id. at 775; see Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Aikens). 
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back and determine sufficiency questions1 when they have moved 
beyond sufficiency determinations (burden of production) to the 
point where preponderance of the evidence (burden of persuasion) is 
to be decided. Aikens did not say that pretext evidence should not be 
considered expressly in determining whether the plaintiff satisfied the 
burden of persuasion. A couple of developments since Aikens call 
into question whether that case supports not including McDonnell 
Douglas in jury instructions. First, there are now jury trials in Title 
VII cases, and it is not obvious that the Supreme Court's admonition 
to courts would apply equally to juries. Second, the admonition in 
Aikens was not to return to considering the prima facie case when the 
case is fully tried and the issue before the court is whether the burden 
of persuasion has been satisfied. That directive does not apply 
equally to the question of whether the defendant's articulated reason 
was pretextual. Whereas the prima facie case at the first stage of 
McDonnell Douglas is about the plaintiff's burden of production, the 
pretext question at the third stage is relevant to both burden of pro-
duction and burden of persuasion. The Supreme Court stated in St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks that "rejection of the defendant's prof-
fered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of 
intentional discrimination." 1 2 0 This passage suggests that it would be 
appropriate to include an instruction regarding the third stage of 
McDonnell Douglas in jury instructions, stating that if the jury disbe-
lieves the articulated reason it may find that the plaintiff has-proven 
intentional discrimination. The two circuits that have endorsed in-
cluding a pretext instruction have relied on Hicks.12' The fact that two 
circuits approve of a pretext jury instruction and at least one circuit 
rejects such a jury instruction, indicates that Aikens does not fore-
close the jury from considering a part of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis. 
Even if Hicks permits such an instruction, however, Professor 
Malamud argues that it is inappropriate because such an instruction 
will simply confuse jurors.1 2   She is partially correct. The entire 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, with its language about shifting burdens 
of production, may confuse jurors. Furthermore, stages one and two 
119. In Aikens, the sufficiency issue with which the lower courts were grappling was whether 
plaintiff had established a prima facie case. 460 U.S. at 713-14. 
120. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (emphasis in original). 
121. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1998); Cabrera v. Jakabo-
vitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994). 
122. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2323. 
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primarily deal with sufficiency issues that are properly decided by the 
court, not the jury, anyway. Nonetheless, the pared-down instruction 
required by the Second and Third Circuits should be given: 
[T]he jury needs to be told two things: (1) it is the plaintiff's burden 
to persuade the jurors by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the ... job ... was denied because of race (or, in other cases, be-
cause of some other legally invalid reason), and (2) the jury is enti-
tled to infer, but need not infer, that this burden has been met if 
they find that the four facts previously set forth [facts proving 
prima facie case] have been established and they disbelieve the de-
fendant's explanation.12 
In approving such an instruction, the Third Circuit rejected 
other types of instructions as inadequate. 124 At the heart of the court's 
rejection of other types of instructions as inadequate is the concern 
that invidious employment discrimination is hard to ferret out, and 
the issue is what kind of instruction that relates the law to the evi-
dence will help the jury with that ultimate question. The court sup-
ported its mandate of the pared-down McDonnell Douglas instruc-
tion, explaining that the "[permissible] inference of discrimination 
arising from pretext" is based on common sense.1 25 The instruction is 
needed, however, because 
[w]ithout a charge on pretext, the course of the jury's deliberations 
will depend on whether the jurors are smart enough or intuitive 
enough to realize that inferences of discrimination may be drawn 
from the evidence establishing plaintiff's prima facie case and the 
pretextual nature of the employer's proffered reasons for its ac-
tions. It does not denigrate the intelligence of our jurors to suggest 
that they need some instruction in the permissibility of drawing that 
inference." 
(b) Appropriate Because of its Helpfulness in Determining the 
Ultimate Question 
All of the foregoing discussion about the appropriateness of a 
McDonnell Douglas jury instruction takes place in a world governed 
by the Hicks brand of McDonnell Douglas analysis. Professor Mala-
mud's ultimate suggestion is that McDonnell Douglas be abandoned 
123. Cabrera, 24 F.3d at 382 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Smith, 147 F.3d at 
280 (" [J]urors must be instructed that they are entitled to infer, but need not, that the plaintiff's 
ultimate burden of demonstrating intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evi-
dence can be met if they find that the facts needed to make up the prima facie case have been 
established and they disbelieve the employer's explanation for its decision."). 
124. Smith, 147 F.3d at 280. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 281. 
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entirely. Thus, it is fair to ask whether McDonnell Douglas is helpful 
to jurors in determining the ultimate question. The Supreme Court 
established the proof structure because of the difficulty of determin-
ing the causation question in the absence of direct evidence. As the 
Court has recognized, the ultimate issue involves resolving a state of 
mind - discriminatory intent.127 In other contexts, the law has ad-
dressed this difficult determination of a subjective state of mind by 
creating a more objective determination that is more easily evaluated 
by factfinders. For example, it is basic blackletter law that the intent 
that is necessary to prove an intentional tort can be established by 
proving either that the tortfeasor had the purpose to produce the re-
sults (subjective state of mind) or that the tortfeasor knew to a sub-
stantial certainty that the results would be produced (objective stan-
dard to assess state of mind).'" Is a determination of pretext under 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis any less probative of intentional dis-
crimination than knowledge to a substantial certainty is of intent in 
tort law? I say a determination of pretext is probative of intentional 
discrimination and appropriate on two grounds: as a matter of fact 
(employers who give pretextual reasons usually have intentionally 
discriminated);1 29 and as a matter of policy (even though the proxy of 
pretext results in errors, strong public policy justifies tolerating such 
errors).'30 Professor Malamud disagrees. 
3. McDonnell Douglas and the Incursion of Employment 
Discrimination Law Into Employment at Will 
Professor Malamud attempts to buttress her argument by pos-
iting that McDonnell Douglas "lacks the core of principle to which 
[Karl] Llewellyn would look for interpretive guidance."13' She then 
explains that "the earlier cases in the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
line contain readily quotable passages explaining the need to eradi-
cate discrimination," 31 2 but that the Court diluted those proclamations 
by including in "the same cases ... passages, less quotable but more 
closely tied to the Court's actual holding, that articulate a need to 
127. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716-17. 
128. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 33-34 
(5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
129. See discussion supra part II.A.1. 
130. See discussion supra part II.A.2. 
131. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2312. 
132. Id. at 2312-13. 
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protect management prerogative against undue incursions.""' Far 
from undermining the core of principle of McDonnell Douglas, these 
passages in the Court's opinions vividly depict the clash between the 
employment discrimination laws and the employment-at-will doc-
trine. Thus, these passages evince not some flaw in McDonnell 
Douglas, but rather a recognition that the employment discrimination 
laws "operate against the presumed backdrop of at-will employ-
ment." 31 4 
The passages in the Court's opinions regarding employers' pre-
rogatives and the results in many of the cases demonstrate why the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure remains vital to employment dis-
crimination law even after Hicks, or perhaps especially after Hicks. 
Employment at will often has triumphed over the employment dis-
crimination laws, as in Hicks, and weakened McDonnell Douglas as 
an aid to plaintiffs. Nonetheless, that proof structure still remains at 
the vanguard of the battle, serving as a constant reminder of the in-
cursion of the federal employment discrimination statutes on the once 
inviolate domain of employer power and prerogative. As the sentinel 
guarding the border between employment discrimination law and 
employment at will, McDonnell Douglas retains both practical and 
symbolic significance. 
As discussed above, the employment-at-will doctrine is the ulti-
mate manifestation of employer power and prerogative, entitling em-
ployers to take actions for a bad reason, good reason, or no reason.135 
It is obvious that the employment discrimination statutes impinge on 
that doctrine to some extent, declaring particular "bad" reasons to be 
illegal.36 McDonnell Douglas is an express recognition that the em-
ployment discrimination laws do check employers' formerly unbri-
133. Id. at 2313. 
134. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1233 (3d Cir. 1994), judgment vacat-
ed, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995); see also Kenneth G. Parker, Note, After-Acquired Evidence in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEX. L. REV. 403, 430 (1993) (asserting 
that Congress intended for Title VII to alter employment at will only "slightly"). During the 
debate over Title VII, Senator Hubert Humphrey stated as follows: " [E]mployers may hire and 
fire, promote and refuse to promote for any reason, good or bad, provided only that individuals 
may not be discriminated against because of race, religion, sex, or national origin." 110 CONG. 
REC. 6549 (1964). See also Estlund, supra note 30, at 1671 (stating that whether Hicks is a cor-
rect interpretation of Title VII or not, "it vividly illustrates the gravitational pull of the at-will 
presumption even within the most entrenched province of wrongful discharge law"). 
135. See supra note 29. 
136. See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A 
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 71 (1990) (asserting that under 
the federal employment discrimination laws " [t]he nearly absolute freedom that the employer 
once enjoyed is gone"). 
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dled prerogative. Under McDonnell Douglas, employers may not re-
spond to charges of discrimination by asserting that they are free to 
act for any reason or no reason. Rather, the second and third stages 
of the proof structure require an employer to assert and defend its 
reason in order to ensure that the reason was not discriminatory. In 
view of the fact that many of the Court's decisions have both rhetori-
cally and practically subordinated the discrimination laws to employer 
prerogatives, 37 the McDonnell Douglas pronouncement is important 
to preserve the principle that employers charged with discrimination 
will be required to explain their reasons. 
One could argue that even in an open-ended inquiry regarding 
employment discrimination, employers would defend by articulating 
and producing evidence regarding their legitimate reasons. I think 
that is true in the vast majority of cases. The McDonnell Douglas 
proof structure, however, mandates such a response. It gives proce-
dural significance to both the employer's articulation of a reason and 
the employer's success or failure in responding to a plaintiff's proof of 
pretext. If an employer does not produce evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie 
case, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment."' If an employer cannot 
meet an employee's evidence regarding pretext at the third stage, the 
analysis does not require a judgment for the plaintiff, but it does focus 
attention on the meaning of the employer's inability to credibly ex-
plain its actions. Although Hicks diminishes the functional signifi-
cance of the third stage, it still will be unusual for a factfinder to dis-
believe an employer's reasons but to conclude that the true reason 
was nondiscriminatory. 
In a recent case, Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, Inc.,13 the Virginia 
Supreme Court refused to adopt the McDonnell Douglas framework 
for a state wrongful discharge claim. The court's rationale supports 
137. See supra text accompanying note 132. Many of the Supreme Court's decisions subor-
dinate employment discrimination law to employment at will. I trace these cases back to Furnco 
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In Furnco, the Court admonished courts not 
to reject employers' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons on the ground that less discrimina-
tory practices are feasible. The Court explained that courts are not competent to restructure 
employers' business practices. Id. at 578. Later, the Court emphasized that employer preroga-
tives are preserved by Title VII, and proclaimed that "[t]his balance between employee rights 
and employer prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us." Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 239. Even in a case perceived to be a victory for plaintiffs because it rejected after-
acquired evidence as a complete defense in employment discrimination cases, the Court con-
jured up the mantra regarding balance between employer prerogatives and employees' rights to 
permit use of such evidence as a limitation on remedies. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361-62. 
138. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
139. 483 S.E.2d 203 (Va. 1997). 
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my argument that McDonnell Douglas is pivotal to employment dis-
crimination law's holding its ground in its struggle with employment 
at will: 
Given the Commonwealth's strong commitment to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, and because we conclude that Virginia's 
procedural and evidentiary framework for establishing a prima fa-
cie case is entirely appropriate for trial of wrongful discharge cases, 
we reject plaintiff's invitation to adopt the McDonnell Douglas in-
direct, burden shifting idea. The McDonnell Douglas outline, re-
fined in later cases, was adopted by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of Title VII actions under the federal Civil Rights Act. There 
was no focus, as here, on the employment-at-will doctrine.'40 
In Jordan, the plaintiff alleged that she was wrongfully dis-
charged for filing a workers' compensation claim and because of her 
race in violation of the public policy of Virginia.14 1 One month after 
plaintiff was terminated without any reason being given, the em-
ployer's attorney sent her a notice, stating in part: "'You were an em-
ployee at will and as such your employer may terminate at anytime 
without cause, which was done.""42 After rejecting the McDonnell 
Douglas framework for wrongful discharge actions, the court af-
firmed the granting of summary judgment for the defendant.1 43  Al-
though the concurring justices agreed that the plaintiff's case was very 
weak, the case demonstrates how employers might implement deci-
sions and how courts might analyze cases if employment discrimina-
tion law were pitted against employment at will without the McDon-
nell Douglas framework. 
In addition to McDonnell Douglas' role in the litigation context 
as guardian of the discrimination laws' "territory," I think that the 
proof structure has significance in day-to-day employment relations. 
Many employers, aware of the requirement of this formal proof struc-
ture that they articulate and defend their reasons in discrimination 
140. Id. at 207. A group of concurring justices joined battle on the proper balance between 
public policy prohibiting employment discrimination and employment at will: 
[T]he majority seems to suggest that Virginia's strong adherence to the employment-
at-will doctrine is more important than Virginia's strong public policy which prohibits 
gender and/or racial discrimination in the work place. . .. We have already determined 
that termination of employment based on racial discrimination violates clear state 
policy against such discrimination and gives rise to a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge, notwithstanding the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Id. at 208 (Hassell, J., concurring). Striking the balance differently than the majority, the con-
curring justices favored leaving open the question of applicability of the McDonnell Douglas 
proof structure. Id. at 209. 
141. Id. at 204. 
142. Id. at 205 (quoting the notice). 
143. Id. at 208. 
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cases, consider their decisions (and sometimes consult their attor-
neys) before acting. This stop-and-think function is particularly im-
portant in a society in which most of the employment discrimination 
is unconscious.'" If McDonnell Douglas causes employers to pause to 
consider that they do not have unbridled freedom to act, it may en-
able them to identify their own unconscious discriminatory motiva-
tions. To the extent that the proof structure prompts such pre-
litigation self-evaluation, it serves the objective of the discrimination 
laws to deter employment discrimination. 
Finally, even if McDonnell Douglas has little effect in preserving 
the incursion of employment discrimination law on employment at 
will either before or during litigation, it has symbolic significance. As 
Professor Malamud recognizes, symbolism is important. Such sym-
bolism is particularly important when it defends against the primary 
threat to the discrimination laws. As long as McDonnell Douglas de-
clares that in intentional discrimination cases employers must state 
their reasons for their actions and have those reasons scrutinized, the 
discrimination statutes symbolically limit employment at will. I fear 
that loss of the symbolic limitation would be followed by the loss of 
all practical limitations. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Professor Malamud closes her article calling for the abandon-
ment of McDonnell Douglas by advising that it would be "better to 
let the cold winds of litigation blow."145 With the Court having thrown 
out the bathwater in Hicks, I think we should keep the baby and 
swaddle it with whatever blankets we can find to protect it against 
those cold winds. Maybe, at the age of twenty-five, the baby is not as 
cute as it was in 1973. I still do not like throwing out babies or 
twenty-five year old proof structures. In both cases, too much is at 
stake. It is not time to jettison McDonnell Douglas. 
144. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
145. Malamud, supra note 23, at 2324. 
